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**CILSS**

COMITÉ PERMANENT INTER-ÉTATS DE LUTTE CONTRE LA SÉCHERESSE DANS LE SAHEL  
PERMANENT INTERSTATE COMMITTEE FOR DROUGHT CONTROL IN THE SAHEL

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**FOOD AID IN THE SAHEL**

by

**Stéphane JOST**

Study prepared for the CILSS/Club du Sahel Conference  
on the Cereals Policies of the Sahelian States

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
MINISTRY OF COOPERATION

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Cellule d'Urgence et de Veille

FOOD AID IN THE SAHEL

The ideas expressed and the facts given in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD, the Club du Sahel or the CILSS.

Prepared by  
Stéphane JOST

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## ABBREVIATIONS

CIDA/AICD	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
CEAO	Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CILSS	Comité Inter-états de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel
CNAVS	Commission Nationale des Aides aux Victimes de la Sécheresse (Mali)
CSA	Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire
EDF	European Development Fund
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
OFNACER	Office National des Céréales (Burkina Faso)
OPAM	Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali
OPVN	Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PL 480	Public Law 480
PRCM	Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréaliier (Mali)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WFP	World Food Program

## INTRODUCTION

### Reflection on food aid since the Nouakchott conference

The CILSS and the Club du Sahel have been involved in reflection on cereals policies, and in particular on the role of food aid, for some considerable time. For many years those organizations have supported exchanges in an effort to approach the questions under consideration in the light of new analyses and new ideas.

After the second conference of the Club du Sahel (Ottawa, 1977), at which a food strategy for the Sahel was presented, Nouakchott (2-8 July 1979) was the first conference to deal specifically with problems linked to food aid, and to reassess the validity of this type of aid.

At the outcome of that conference, the select committee of the CILSS and the Club du Sahel organized several meetings on food aid:

- a meeting of cooperation agency leaders (Paris, September 1981);
- a meeting of Sahelian leaders (Dakar, October 1981);
- a meeting of donors and Sahelian leaders (Dakar, June 1982).

These meetings confirmed the analyses and appraisals made during the Nouakchott conference.

Problems involving harvest forecasts, logistics and counterpart funds were also examined, and concrete recommendations were made in an effort to reduce, and subsequently to eliminate structural food aid.

Further to a meeting of the DAC on food aid and development cooperation (Paris, 26-27 November 1984), a new breakdown was drawn up during a concertation meeting on food aid supplied to CILSS Member States, which was held in Paris on 7 December 1984. In addition to problems of crop assessment, emphasis was laid on the development of "triangular" transactions (of switch deals) and on the need for coordination between donors and beneficiary States at the national and regional levels.

Thus, the Council of Ministers of the CILSS meeting at Nouakchott in January 1985 asked the Secretariat of the CILSS to draw up a "plan for forecasting and managing food crisis situations in the countries of the Sahel". In view of this, the Council in May 1985 revised the mandate of the CILSS.

A "network for famine prevention in the Sahel" was set up at the first meeting of cooperation agency experts in Paris (20-21 May 1985). This network is intended to be a flexible, informal forum for the exchange of ideas and concertation of efforts. The network provides updated information bulletins to favor discussion and facilitate the decision-making process for the parties concerned.

table 1


FOOD AID TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL (1970/71-85/86)

YEARS	BURKINA	CAPE VERDE	GAMBIA	GUINEA	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	CHAD	CILSS	WORLD
70/71	47,8	0	2,6	0	27	8,4	4,6	15,8	0,1	106,3	12357,3
71/72	35,1	0	1,9	0	32	29,5	13	37,3	0	148,8	12512,8
72/73	30,7	0	3,9	0	64,9	24,6	45,7	37,9	10	217,7	9964,1
73/74	107,9	0	7,6	0	179,9	95,2	195	101,3	66,5	753,4	5818,7
74/75	28	6,9	9	10,9	106,5	47,9	72,5	26,8	19,7	328,2	8399,4
75/76	15,7	14,9	3	10	39,1	26,9	85,5	16,1	3,6	214,8	6847
76/77	22	22,6	2,7	14,2	0,2	28,9	46	30,9	33,9	201,4	9022,4
77/78	50,5	48,3	17,6	23,3	32,8	51	19,9	166,7	47,2	457,3	9215,5
78/79	49,1	30,9	7,4	16,5	21,5	31,1	23,3	59,9	22,9	262,6	9499,7
79/80	36,5	34,1	6,8	17,6	21,8	26,2	9,1	60,8	16,2	229,1	8887
80/81	51,1	31,1	16,1	26,2	50,2	106,1	10,9	152,5	14,1	458,3	9941,6
81/82	80,9	53,6	21	30,3	66,4	86,4	71,4	82,7	28,6	521,3	9140,2
82/83	45,4	34,8	12,8	34,9	88,1	71,3	11,8	91	36	426,1	9198
83/84	57,3	62,5	16,9	19,4	108,5	128,8	12,7	146,3	73,8	626,2	9831
84/85	123,7	49,6	20,6	30,9	265,6	135,1	218,3	130,4	163,3	1137,5	12462,6
85/86*	55,9	60,6	8	7	118,1	99,3	86,4	71,7	42,7	549,7	
70/86	837,6	449,9	157,9	241,2	1222,6	996,7	926,1	1228,1	578,6	6638,7	143097,3

Estimates 1/7/86

source: FAO

GRAPH 1



Five studies were prepared for the first meeting of the network (23-24 October 1985):

- forecasting 1985 harvests, deficits and surpluses (FAO and CILSS);
- breakdown of logistical problems (WFP);
- breakdown of triangular transactions (French Development Agency);
- breakdown of counterpart funds (Club du Sahel);
- reflection on food aid and development (WFP).

The network is due to meet again in November 1986 for an exchange of information on the past year and for discussion of outlooks for 1987.

Now, seven years after the Nouakchott conference, another conference has been organized on the cereals policies of Sahelian States (Mindelo, December 1986). This summary of food aid in the Sahel presented at the WFP/ADB seminar in Abidjan (September 1986) will thus also be used at the network meeting planned for November 1986 and for the Mindelo conference.

This summary gives a breakdown of the food aid received by CILSS Member States (Part I), outlines the links between food aid and cereals policies (part II), and makes a number of recommendations as to the types of action and themes of reflection that could lead to proposals for reform and that are liable to favor discussion on questions related to food aid (Part III).

## **I) BREAKDOWN OF FOOD AID RECEIVED BY SAHELIAN STATES**

### **1.1 Breakdown by country of destination**


FAO statistics (see table 1) indicate that CILSS States (including Guinea) received between 1970-71 and 1985-86 more than 6.6 million tons of cereals, i.e., an average of 415,000 tons/year.

Over the same period, there were two high points in the supply of food aid (see graph 1). Those high points correspond to the droughts of 1973-74 (750,000 tons, i.e., 11.3% of total) and of 1984-85 (1,137,000 tons, i.e., more than one-sixth of all food aid received over the sixteen-year period).

The principal beneficiaries of food aid were Senegal and Mali (18.5% and 18.4%), followed by Mauritania (15%), Niger (14%) and Burkina (12.6%). The remaining 21.5% was received by the other countries in the Sahel.

Graphs 2 to 10 show developments in quantities of food aid received by each country. The following remarks can be made:


BURKINA FASO  
Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86



BASE YEARS

source: FAO


CAPE VERDE  
Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86



BASE YEARS

source: FAO


GAMBIA  
Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86



BASE YEARS

source: FAO




GUINEA-BISSAU  
Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86



BASE YEARS


source: FAO






SENEGAL

Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86




CHAD

Food aid (cereals) received from 1970/71 to 85/86



CILSS COUNTRIES



- All the country-specific graphs have high points corresponding to the periods of drought (1973-74 and 1984-85).
- Countries with seaboards (Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Senegal, and, to a certain degree, Mauritania) also experienced a high point in 1977-78.
- Mali has received more food aid than any other CILSS country, and since 1984-85 has received greater quantities of food aid than any other country in the Sahel. Nevertheless, after the 1973-74 drought, it received no aid in 1975-76, and very small amounts until 1979-80. It is conceivable that this situation is the result of the creation of the PRMC (program for the restructuration of the cereals market), and of the pluri-annual commitments made under that program.
- The situation in Mauritania sharply deteriorated from the beginning of the 1980s (average of approximately 100,000 tons from 1980 to 1986, compared with an average of 30,000 tons over the preceding six years).
- In normal years, Niger receives practically no food aid, but in the event of drought it is suddenly obliged to handle enormous quantities. In 1973-74 four times more food aid was received than in 1972-73, and in 1984-85 seventeen times more food aid was received than the year before.
- Overall, expected quantities for 1985-86 are greater than those received in a 'normal' drought-free year, although harvests have been good, and surpluses have been generated.

A paradoxical situation thus exists. According to FAO breakdowns established in June 1986, food aid commitments are 133,000 tons greater than demand, and yet exceptional local purchasing requirements have already reached 200,000 tons. There are clearly grounds to believe that there is too much food aid, and that it is unsuited to local requirements. Although the products under consideration are not necessarily the same, donors' food-aid policy for 1985-86 was intended to be:

- to purchase whenever possible on regional markets with surpluses;
- to stop sending food aid when requirements had been met.

## 1.2 Breakdown by donor country or organization

### a) United States

The United States is by far the top supplier of food aid to the Sahel. From 1979-80 to 1985-86, the US delivered close to 1,500,000 tons of cereals, of which some 500,000 tons (42.6% of total aid received) were sent in 1984-85.

Most US aid is distributed free of charge (three-quarters in 1984-85), particularly by US NGOs specialized in that type of

activity. Those organizations have often been criticized for adopting methods that are at times too expeditive, and for the considerable negative effects that the food they distribute has on programs run by other NGOs. US aid is still intended first and foremost to be emergency aid. Saleable aid (PL 280 - Title II - section 216) is sent in considerably lower quantities.

#### b) European Economic Community

The EEC is the second-largest supplier of food aid to the Sahelian States. Between 1981 and 1986 more than 500,000 tons of cereals and dairy products were provided from the Community's budget. In November 1984 an exceptional program (the Dublin Plan) was implemented to complement donations paid for under the annual budget and to supply additional aid to African nations affected by the drought. The Dublin Plan was followed in 1985-86 by a "rehabilitation and reflation plan".

The EEC appears to be highly sensitive to development problems, and has taken the following action:

- introduction of programs for the definition and support of food strategies in four African countries, including Mali;
- authorization of NGO requests for food aid coupled with requests for financing for development projects utilizing this aid;
- various programs to purchase from local sources or from neighboring countries, e.g., in early 1985 to supply aid rapidly to Mali, Niger and Chad;
- provision of financing for the first "substitution projects" in 1986 (in view of improved harvests), which allow for the replacement of food aid with equivalent funds to be used for projects linked to improvement of the food self-sufficiency of the country in question (see 2.4 d).

#### c) EEC members

In addition to the programs implemented under the Community budget, which EEC member countries finance, those countries have national bilateral aid programs, which were also reinforced in 1985 under the Dublin Plan.

- France sent more than 200,000 tons of cereals to Sahelian States between 1980-81 and 1985-86. In liaison with NGOs, France in 1985 set up small-scale projects for purchasing food in areas with surpluses and selling them in areas with deficits in Burkina, Mali and Senegal.
- West Germany is also an important donor (approximately 150,000 tons between 1981-82 and 1984-85). Its aid is chiefly intended to constitute national food security stocks, which

are under the strict control of West Germany and the relevant cereals boards.

- Italy has recently increased its level of aid, particularly as a result of major budget allocations made for cooperation in 1985.

**d) Canada**

Canada has increased its food aid to Sahelian countries over recent years (from 21,000 tons in 1983-84 to 41,500 tons in 1985-86), and has diversified the products it dispatches: alongside wheat and corn (maize), Canada sends beans, peas, powdered milk, and, this year, 3,650 tons of rape seed oil.

However, the major innovation of 1986 involves experiments with triangular transactions: 8,300 tons of millet and sorghum for Mali and 5,500 tons for Niger. For 1986-87, the ADCI (Canada's development agency) is expected to move towards converting all its food aid for Sahelian countries into purchasing commitments in those countries and in neighboring countries).

**e) World Food Program (WFP)**

Food aid sent by the WFP is used under its own development projects (particularly Food for Work) or under its emergency aid projects (distribution free of charge). The proportion of WFP aid falling into the emergency aid category has increased during periods of drought. Overall, in the ten years from 1975 to 1985, the WFP will have supplied more than 900,000 tons of food aid, one-third of which has been dispatched over the last two years. Principal beneficiary countries are Chad and Mali (sharp increases over recent years) and Senegal (particularly in 1977-78 and 1980-81).

The WFP has recently made an assessment of its emergency operations in Africa (1). This assessment highlights the problems of delivery times (less than 30% of the foodstuffs arrive within 3 months, 50% between 3 and 7 months, and a small proportion takes more than 12 months to arrive), and demonstrates the negative effects on development programs that free distribution can have.

**f) NGOs and private organizations**

Only limited quantities of food aid are sent directly by private organizations and financed from their own funds. Considerable media time is nevertheless devoted to these actions, (e.g., Band Aid or SOS Sahel '84).

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(1) "Evaluation of Emergency Operations: Lessons to be Learnt from the Food Crisis in Africa" (WFP/CFA Document 22/7 Add.1, Rome, July 1986)

Certain NGOs, however, are developing programs for local purchasing and subsequent resale in areas with deficits, financed by development agencies or by funds collected under information campaigns organized in Europe to promote triangular transactions (Afrique Verte campaign: "for peoples' right to feed themselves").

### 1.3 Breakdown of developments

Having examined quantitative aspects of food aid to the Sahel, we are now going to deal with qualitative aspects by summarizing the principal changes that have taken place in the decision-making process and in the distribution and utilization of food aid itself.

#### a) Assessment of crops and requirements

Coordination is beginning to show results in this respect.

The Club du Sahel has produced a report on the systems used for forecasting harvests that are operational or under development in the countries of the Sahel (2). A meeting was organized on 29-30 April 1986 to discuss this report.

The FAO now also gives details of the extent and location of available surpluses.

A great deal of work still remains to be done, however, in order to reach a better assessment of harvests, and thus of requirements. There is much uncertainty involved in the various parameters that are used in calculating cereals breakdowns, and the precision of deficit estimates can thus be somewhat illusory.

#### b) Distribution of food aid: logistical problems


We now have fairly precise knowledge of the principal blockages in the distribution system and can thus gauge where intervention is required.

- France has financed a study to analyze the conditions of transportation of food aid in Africa.
- Switzerland has recently completed a study in collaboration with the CILSS, drawing up a fairly complete inventory of the obvious bottlenecks to distribution of food aid in 1984-85 (3). The 33 projects proposed in this study represent a total cost of US\$ 18 billion.

(2) "Forecasting Critical Food Situations in the Sahel: Early Warning Systems", R. Pons, March 1986

(3) "Study of Technical Bottlenecks: Inventory and Propositions for Immediate Action", ASC-CILSS, May 1986

DISTRIBUTION OF AID WITHIN THE SAHEL



- The WFP has managed to identify logistical problems through its "Africa Task Force", and sends a weekly telex to the international community on the supply situation (requirements, aid announced, deficits, etc.) and on the state of delivery (amount of aid received, blockages in ports, logistical problems, etc.).
- At the local level, regular concertation meetings have been organized in order to monitor the situation and coordinate the arrival and utilization of aid with the national authorities.

### c) Programming of deliveries

Alongside technical problems, the question of programming of deliveries should also be examined.

The difficulties encountered are largely a result of the simple fact that most food aid arrives in the countries at the same time. While requirements are known after the harvest, towards the end of the year, the decision-making process and the subsequent procedure for implementing those decisions and transporting food aid take several months, and most deliveries thus only begin to arrive in May or June, i.e., six months after the end of the harvest. (In May 1985 only one-third of the aid that was expected in Niger was actually delivered.) It is thus during this period that obstructions and delays appear, and major problems are encountered in ensuring that food aid leaves the ports or reaches inland destinations.

Late arrivals and the obstacles mentioned above push back deliveries towards the end of the year, particularly during the rainy season, when distribution is much more difficult, and during harvests, when deliveries can be a nuisance or even have damaging consequences.

As with the distribution of information on the food-aid situation, international coordination could make it possible to establish, in collaboration with regional governments, a global supply plan for the countries of the Sahel. This plan would have two main advantages:

- regulation of timing of deliveries for constant supply during critical periods (between the end of stocks and the beginning of the harvest);
- geographic regulation of the various delivery/distribution points.



d) **Triangular transactions: local purchasing**

The study of triangular transactions in West Africa (4) that was prepared for the October 1985 meeting of the network for famine prevention in the Sahel indicated that relatively large amounts of food aid were provided by donors through triangular transactions.

. In 1985 more than 85,000 tons of products (some 100,000 tons of wheat equivalent) were purchased in West Africa, and more than 100,000 tons (some 175,000 tons of wheat equivalent) in other third-world countries, particularly in Thailand, Pakistan (rice) and Honduras (corn). Principal purchasers were Japan, the Netherlands, West Germany, the EEC and the WFP.

. The data currently available for 1986 indicates that the tonnage purchased in West Africa will be at least as great as that of 1985. Further, the substitution action financed by the EEC, representing 55,000 tons of cereals, should be added to these figures (see point e).

Despite a tendency to fear the teething troubles involved, donors have moved noticeably towards increased use of triangular transactions.

. Since November 1984 the WFP has authorized its local representatives to purchase up to \$ 20,000 worth of foodstuffs on local markets without requiring prior approval from central office.

. The EEC on 13 March 1986 organized a meeting of experts on purchasing transactions in developing countries. After exchanges on procedures and examination of the analyses of different member countries, it was decided to implement active and regular coordination between the relevant leaders, and a questionnaire was distributed to further this coordination. Moreover, the first substitution projects were launched in 1986.

. In view of the worrying situation of stocks and late arrivals of food aid at the end of 1985, Canada cancelled the deliveries of corn it had planned, and converted them into credits for local purchases. In this way 8,300 tons of millet and sorghum were purchased for Mali, and 5,500 tons for Niger. Further, Canada is planning to convert into credits all its food aid for the Sahel in 1986-87, and has carried out a study on the availability of cereals in the region. This move constitutes a complete change in Canadian food aid policy in the Sahel.

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(4) "Appraisal of Triangular Transactions (Purchasing Food Aid on Local Markets) in West Africa", CILSS/Club du Sahel meeting, October 1985

## TRIANGULARE: PRINCIPAL CEREALS TRANSACTIONS

DELIVERIES TO COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL FINANCED IN 1985 BY DONORS AND SOURCED FROM THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES OUTSIDE AFRICA

financing country or organization	instrument (1)	country of origin	country of destination	amount (tons) and type of aid	wheat equivalent (TOPE) (2)
WFP (donation from Japan)		THAILAND	GAMBIA	2,250 (rice)	6,525
		THAILAND	GUINEA-BISSAU	1,450 (rice)	4,205
		THAILAND	SENEGAL	310 (rice)	90
PRMC (Mali)	counterpart fund	THAILAND	MALI	13,200 (sorghum)	13,200
CANADA	IEFS	HONDURAS	MALI	5,000 (corn)	5,000
EEC	bilateral	THAILAND	SENEGAL	11,000 (sorghum)	11,000
BELGIUM	IEFS	HONDURAS	NIGER	5,000 (corn)	5,000
NETHERLANDS	WFP	PAKISTAN	MALI	2,890 (rice)	8,360
	bilateral	THAILAND	MALI	4,000 (rice)	11,600
	bilateral	THAILAND	NIGER	5,000 (corn)	5,000
	bilateral	THAILAND	CHAD	200 (rice)	580
WEST GERMANY	IEFS	PAKISTAN	GAMBIA	2,300 (rice)	6,750
	IEFS	HONDURAS	MALI	5,000 (corn)	5,000
	IEFS	HONDURAS	NIGER	3,070 (corn)	3,070
BRITAIN	WFP	PAKISTAN	MALI	1,785 (rice)	5,180
	bilateral	CHINA	MALI	852 (rice)	2,550
JAPAN	WFP	THAILAND	CHAD	4,050 (rice)	11,750
	WFP	PAKISTAN	CHAD	4,030 (rice)	11,700
	IEFS	HONDURAS	NIGER	2,000 (corn)	2,000
	bilateral	PAKISTAN	BURKINA	3,170 (rice)	9,300
	bilateral	BURMA	BURKINA	3,100 (rice)	9,250
	bilateral	THAILAND	CAPE VERDE	925 (rice)	2,400
	bilateral	THAILAND	GAMBIA	2,300 (rice)	6,670
	bilateral	THAILAND	GUINEA-BISSAU	4,020 (rice)	11,600
	bilateral	THAILAND	MALI	2,760 (rice)	7,450
	bilateral	THAILAND	MAURITANIA	3,430 (rice)	9,540
	bilateral	THAILAND	NIGER	2,250 (rice)	6,220
	bilateral	PAKISTAN	NIGER	3,900 (rice)	10,760
SWITZERLAND	bilateral	THAILAND	SENEGAL	7,200 (rice)	19,200
	bilateral	ARGENTINA	CAPE VERDE	1,500 (corn)	1,500
TOTAL				109,912	174,300

- (1) bilateral: bilateral aid handled by donor  
WFP: bilateral aid executed by WFP  
IEFS: International Emergency Food Stock (WFP)  
counterpart funds: aid financed on counterpart fund of former food aid
- (2) Estimate made on International Convention on Food Aid criteria


## TRIANGULARS: PRINCIPAL TRANSACTIONS TO SAHEL COUNTRIES FINANCED IN 1985 BY DONORS AND SOURCED IN WEST AFRICA

financing country or organization	instrument (1)	country of origin	country of destination	amount (tons) and type of aid	wheat equivalent (tons) (2)
PRMC (Mali)	counterpart fund	IVORY COAST	MALI	4,000 (millet and sorghum)	4,000
EAA (Mali)	NGO	IVORY COAST	MALI	4,000 (millet)	4,000
EEC	bilateral	VARIOUS	MAURITANIA	500 (seeds)	500
	bilateral	VARIOUS	MALI	. 6,000 (sorghum)	6,000
				. 3,000 (broken rice)	8,700
				. 3,570 (seeds)	3,570
	bilateral	IVORY COAST	NIGER	1,500 (corn)	1,500
	bilateral	TOGO	NIGER	7,500 (corn)	7,500
	bilateral	NIGER/NIGERIA	NIGER	c. 5,500 (millet)	c. 5,500
	bilateral	CAMERDON	CHAD	. c. 12,000 (rice and corn)	c. 15,000
. c. 1,000 (sugar and dried meat)				-	
bilateral	IVORY COAST	CHAD	2,000 (veg. oil)	-	
DENMARK	IEFS	IVORY COAST	BURKINA	4,000 (corn)	4,000
FRANCE	bilateral	SENEGAL	SENEGAL	800 (millet) + 100 (rice)	1,100
	bilateral	IVORY COAST	MALI	300 (millet)	300
	bilateral	MALI	MALI	c. 100 (various)	100
	bilateral	GHANA	BURKINA	40 (millet)	40
NETHERLANDS	bilateral	BENIN	NIGER	5,000 (corn)	5,000
WEST GERMANY	bilateral	BENIN	NIGER	5,000 (corn)	5,000
	bilateral	IVORY COAST	NIGER	1,500 (white corn)	1,500
	bilateral	CAMERDON	CHAD	4,500 (rice)	13,050
USA	bilateral	GHANA	MALI	10,000 (corn)	10,000
	bilateral	GHANA	BURKINA	5,000 (corn)	5,000
TOTAL				86,910	101,360

(1) bilateral: bilateral aid handled by donor  
 counterpart fund: aid financed on counterpart fund of former food aid  
 NGO: aid handled by a non-governmental organization  
 IEFS: International Emergency Food Stock (IEFS)

(2) Estimate made on International Convention on Food Aid criteria

KNOWN TRIANGULARS IN 1985



TRIANGULAR TRANSACTIONS TOWARDS THE SAHEL

in 1985:  
 purchased in coastal countries  
 purchased in Sahelian countries  
 + c. 110,000 t outside Sahel

- . France in 1985 established specific credits for local purchasing, and for 1986 has resolved to supply up to 5% of its program in this form.
- . Even the United States, which ostensibly disapproves of the principles of compensated trade, carried out a barter deal in 1985 involving the supply of 9,000 tons of US rice to Ghana in exchange for 10,000 tons of white maize for Mali and 5,000 tons for Burkina. The USA also plans between now and the end of 1986 to conduct a study on triangular transactions (advantages, disadvantages, policies of other donors, etc.) in an effort to clarify its position on this matter.
- . NGOs also implement development projects linked to exchanges of cereals, cereals banks, and operate funds for purchasing in areas with surpluses:
  - in the countries of the Sahel, where local NGOs or NGO collectives propose and carry out this type of transaction;
  - in countries of the North, where various NGOs have joined forces to support these transactions and to approach political leaders in an effort to further the development of these transactions.
- . At the international and legal levels, the new food aid Convention that has recently been renegotiated and that came into effect on 1st July 1986 now specifies the possibility for donors to carry out local purchases of cereals under the heading of food aid supplied to a particular country, and thus to count those products as part of their commitment.

#### e) Substitution actions

In response to European NGO pressure, a budget line (line 929, entitled "substitution of food aid deliveries" was set up in 1984, and for the first time funds worth 10 million ecus were earmarked on the 1986 budget.

When conditions are suitable, these actions make it possible to replace food aid with financial support that favors the development of agriculture and food production.

The first substitution actions were financed in 1986, and Sahelian countries are involved in all those projects (Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina, for the financial equivalent of 55,000 tons of cereals).

#### f) Uses and impact of the aid provided

During the 1984-85 drought period, some 60% of food aid was distributed free of charge (see table 2).

However, this proportion varies greatly from one beneficiary to another and from one donor to another.

TABLE 2

## FOOD AID COMMITMENTS TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL: BREAKDOWN BY OBJECTIVES (SALE, EMERGENCY, PROJECTS) - 1984/85

COUNTRY (1)	PERIOD	TOTAL COMMITMENT	SALES tons (%)	EMERGENCY tons (%)	PROJECT tons (%)
BURKINA FASO	NOV 84/OCT 85	121,334	60,862 (50.1)	35,951 (29.6)	24,521 (20.2)
CAPE VERDE	JAN/DEC 85	49,980	33,968 (67.9)	6,233 (16.4)	7,779 (15.5)
MALI	NOV 84/OCT 85	232,260	99,873 (43)	115,006 (49.5)	17,381 (7.4)
MAURITANIA	NOV 84/OCT 85	153,999	56,876 (36.9)	83,219 (54)	13,904 (9)
NIGER	OCT 84/SEPT 85	263,995	21,333 (8)	224,075 (84.8)	18,587 (7)
SENEGAL	NOV 84/OCT 85	115,016	57,686 (50.1)	38,757 (33.6)	18,579 (16.1)
CHAD	NOV 84/OCT 85	214,955	28,500 (13.2)	169,996 (79)	16,459 (7.6)
TOTAL		1,151,539	359,092 (31.1)	675,237 (58.6)	117,210 (10.1)

source: WFP Africa Task Force, Status Report No 20, March 1986

(1) excludes Gambia, which was not a food deficit country in 1984/85, and which is not covered by WFP Task Force Africa statistics

Emergency aid distributed free in 1984-85 was at its highest levels in Niger (85%), Chad (79%), Mauritania (54%) and Mali (49.5%), while the majority of that aid was sold in Cape Verde (68%) and in Burkina and Senegal (50%).

The United States is at the top of the league for distributing aid free of charge, and in 1984-85 sold only a quarter of the food aid it provided, whereas most other donors sell at least half.

There is no doubt that the aid provided to the countries of the Sahel made it possible to avoid a real famine, and to limit movements of population groups and the creation of numerous refugee camps that such movements would have made inevitable.

While free distribution is essential in many cases, it is at the root of a number of disruptive effects and cases of diversion:

- . Aid donated in one village is sometimes to be found on sale in the markets of another village, where it could be in direct competition with local produce.
- . Except in Niger, free distribution has demobilized peasant communities working on development projects or Food for Work projects being implemented in the region.
- . Most often, aid has been distributed evenly throughout the population. For technical reasons, it has not always been possible to identify the target groups that should be given priority in the distribution of food aid.
- . Distribution has not been restricted to the most difficult periods. In Mali, distribution continues during and even after the harvest. In Mauritania, distribution is still planned. On the other hand, distribution of food aid has been replaced in Burkina by Food for Work projects, and in Niger it has been discontinued, particularly in an effort to avoid attracting too many nomadic groups.

The WFP is still the main proponent of Food for Work projects. These projects have been stepped up during droughts. There is, however, no place for improvisation in these projects, and they require a complete infrastructure (equipment, staff, etc.) and must be part of a pre-established concrete project.

Niger nevertheless succeeded in mobilizing a large part of its population in this respect in 1984-85. With the assistance of the AFVP (in-the-field technical support), the EEC and France (seed deliveries), Niger launched a large-scale contre-saison crop program involving 300,000 to 400,000 persons in 150 locations and brought levels of cereals production estimated at between 6,000 and 8,000 tons (60%) and market gardening crops (40%), i.e., the equivalent of 300 to 400 kg of food per family. This program has made it possible to avoid mass movements of

population groups (5) and has demonstrated the political will of the government of Niger to take drought-related problems in hand.

### g) Counterpart funds

As for triangular transactions, the study carried out in 1985 for the meeting of the network for famine prevention in the Sahel made it possible to establish a country-by-country breakdown of counterpart funds, and to identify the problems involved in setting up, managing and utilizing those funds (6).

Further to the recommendations of the Nouakchott conference, counterpart funds have been created in the different countries in the Sahel, and have met with varying degrees of success. The intended uses of certain funds have not always been clearly specified. They are often used by cereals boards to counter deficits, or even to bridge government budget gaps. This flexibility is largely due to the fact that donors originally paid little or no attention to such funds, but in recent years donors have become considerably more demanding:

- precise, regular statements of accounts are requested;
- funds are often under joint management (Canada, West Germany);
- framework agreements are more specific;
- donor representatives receive more precise instructions.

However, the most interesting development involves the appearance of joint counterpart funds. The sharing of funds generated by the resale of aid provided by different donors makes it possible to reach a "critical mass" of financing that is available for national-scale action, without implying that the identity of the origin of the assets is lost (a joint fund can be made up of several accounts). The management of these funds strengthens the coordination between donors and local administrators and reinforces dialogue on a more global approach to food aid and its use in the country's development. Joint funds of this type have been set up or are planned in three countries of the Sahel:

- . In Mali, the first joint fund was created in March 1981 to finance the PRMC (program for the restructuration of the cereals market). The present report will not discuss details or give an appraisal of this joint project. Subsequent to the first phase of the project (1981-96), several appraisals were

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(5) "Participation of the AFVP in the Niger Contre-Saison Crop Program, September 1984 - May 1985", Y. Huet and D. Montferrer, AFVP, June 1985 and regular reports by the AFVP or by the Directorate for agricultural production in Niger

(6) "Counterpart Funds in the Countries of the Sahel", N. Massignon, CILSS/Club du Sahel, October 1986



made (7), and this program is often quoted and studied as an ideal example. It can nonetheless be said that the PRCM made it possible for the first time to define and support a global cereals policy. It began to fulfil certain of the objectives that had been fixed (reduction of the operating deficit of the OPAM (Office des produits agricoles du Mali), liberalization of the cereals market, increased prices for producers).

- . In Senegal, the joint fund was created slightly over a year ago, in May 1985. Donors have met with the Senegalese government on numerous occasions and have laid down the major guidelines for the use of this fund. (support for both production and consumption aspects of local cereals systems).
- . In Mauritania, the decision to set up a counterpart fund was taken more than a year ago, but there appear to be practical difficulties, although everything is ready for signing (donors' agreements, text of decree, etc.).

#### **h) Summary: tables**

The principal factors concerning food aid for the Sahel are summarized in the two tables below. Table 1 refers to donor countries and organizations, while Table 2 involves countries of destination. This diagrammatic summary of the situation clearly does not make it possible to discern the delicate interaction between the different parties involved.

## **II INTEGRATION OF FOOD AID WITHIN CEREALS POLICIES**

### **2.1 Objectives and resources**

The Sahelian States are taking steps to outline and introduce cereals policies, and in-depth examination of those policies can be found in other reports prepared for the CILSS/Club du Sahel Colloquy (particularly the Berg reports). Mention will be made here of the links that can exist between food aid and cereals policies. Firstly, it is useful to examine the different ways in which this aid can become part of cereals policies.

- The most widely known form of food aid involves counterpart funds. Sales of food aid can generate considerable sums of money, especially if they are pooled in joint counterpart funds.
- Food aid products can also find direct uses under cereals policies as "food for work", or in services such as training center canteens, construction sites and can thereby bring savings in purchasing costs.

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(7) "Appraisal of the PRCM", Ministry of Foreign Relations (Cooperation and Development), Paris, 1986.  
See also: "From the Plot to the City: the Cereals System in Mali", S. Coelo, September 1985; "Technical Assistance for the PRCM", PRCM Annual Report, Republic of Mali/BDPA

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD AID IN THE SAHEL

Countries and Donor Organizations

	POLICY DEVELOPMENT	HARVEST FORECAST	LOGISTICS TRANSPORTATION	LOCAL PURCHASING, TRIANGULARS	COUNTERPART FUNDS	REMARKS
ALL COUNTRIES (INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION)	Large accounts sent in 04/85 and in 05/86 improved coordination	Club du Sahel report Meeting 29-30/4/86	Task Force Africa WFP centralization of information	Club du Sahel report on transactions in West Africa	Club du Sahel report on counterpart funds in the Sahel	introduction of Network for the Prevention of Famine
WFP		SIEMS SAHAR	Weekly telexes and WFP reports	Possibility of purchasing up to a value of US\$20,00	Mainly free distribution and food for work	evaluation of emergency operations
FAO	towards total conversion of aid			13,500 tons in 85/86 Study on purchases in region	Practical guide to fund management	
CANADA						
EEC	Dublin Plan (85) + rehabilitation plan	Support for Diagnostic Permanent		Network for follow-up of action + substitution action	Vice-presidency of joint fund with Senegal	Substitution actions Rehabilitation plan
FRANCE	Dublin Plan (85)	Lannion Center ORSTOM SPOI (Orsec Plan?)	Appraisal	Local purchases in 85; 5% of program in 86?	Practical guide	
WEST GERMANY	Dublin Plan (85)			Various	Support for national security stock	Management of national security stock
ITALY	Dublin Plan (85) Major credits in 85	Support Prétrésal				Action still not focused
JAPAN	Sharp rise in aid sent			Purchases in Thailand, Pakistan		Aid mainly supplied in the form of rice

SWITZERLAND

Study of bottlenecks with CILSS

Limited

USA	FENS	USA	FENS
Food Security Act Free distribution		Earlier in 1985 Study planned for 1986	Much free distribution; development of private initiative
Development of local purchases	Médecins Sans Frontières project in Mali	Various transactions Creation of collectives	Projects for cereals banks with resale fund
Sharp rise in amounts received	AGRWNET system Diagnostic Parament project and Précréal	Execution problems (transportation, administrative)	Appearance of joint funds (particularly due to delays) storage problems Arrival of locusts
Average: 40-50,000 tons excl. drought years		Aid received from Ghana Local purchases	Situation unclear Storage problems
Irregular growth drop in USA proportion		Aid received from Togo and Senegal	Labor-intensive projects
Has become top receiver and record- holder of aid received	Early warning unit of the COMVS	Aid received from Ivory Coast, Ghana	FRMC (joint fund since 1981)
Increases since 1980 Mainly receives wheat		Local purchases	Problems of sales of OPAN stocks?
No aid in normal years. Large amounts in 84/85. Considerable fluctuations	NO of AGRWNET		Joint fund planned Very large stocks
Top aid receiver from 70/71 to 85/86 largely from USA		Cereals supplied in 83/84 Aid received from Ivory Coast, Togo in 85	Little aid sold Very large surpluses
Considerable increases	Médecins sans Frontières FENS	Vigna supplied in 85 Local purchases in 85/86	Joint fund since 1985 Surpluses
		Aid received from Cameroun, Ivory Coast	Little aid sold Transportation costs Surplus

- Triangular transactions can provide the country selected as supplier with an outlet for local surpluses, and can thus generate financial resources that can then be utilized directly.
- Food aid can also be purchased by donors inside the same country, and can thereby provide financial resources for areas with surpluses and develop exchanges with areas with deficits.
- New "substitution activities" set up by the EEC allow for direct financing of projects linked to agricultural development and food self-sufficiency.
- Food aid can also form an integral part of agricultural development projects financed by public bodies or private-sector organizations (NGOs).

Food aid thus generates a wide variety of resources, and particularly financial resources. Mention could also be made of the technical assistance that is provided by experts on detachment to cereals boards and other official bodies, or working for the local offices of donor agencies.

What can be done with these resources? One major advantage is that they can be used fairly flexibly:

- Counterpart fund allocation is not always strictly broken down beforehand, as it is for conventional investment projects. Allocation can be negotiated as and when financing is required.
- This type of aid can span several years, and donors are prepared to make commitments to provide aid over a number of years (as has been done in Mali).

On the other hand, there is a need for regular follow-up and continuous negotiation between donors and local governments. The need for coordination is even greater when joint counterpart funds exist.

## 2.2 Food aid and cereals policies

The following section gives a breakdown of the countries that have examined or implemented cereals policies involving food aid in one of the forms described above.

### Burkina Faso

In addition to aid that is under the direct management of the WFP or NGOs (such as the Le Secours Catholique and Cathwell) as part of the mothers and infants protection and school canteens programs, food aid received by Burkina Faso is handled by OFNACER. It does not appear to be part of any well defined program, and at this time there are few clear indications of how counterpart funds are utilized.

## Cape Verde

Food aid principally involves the counterpart funds managed by the National Development Fund, which finances labor-intensive projects. 550 million escudos were spent in 1984 on various hydro-agricultural projects (Ministry for Rural Development) or road construction and maintenance projects (Ministry of Public Works). These programs also play an important role in employing labor from rural areas. Further, the WFP is continuing to support programs for cooperative development and to provide assistance to vulnerable groups and to canteens.

## Mali

Mali is generally quoted as a typical example of integration of food aid within a cereals policy. Some 250,000 tons of cereals worth around \$ 90 million were supplied during the first five-year phase of the PRMC program for the restructuring of the cereals market, which was set up in 1981. The funds generated through resale of this aid, together with the revenue from sales of locally purchased cereals, have made it possible to introduce the reforms decided upon:

- higher official prices (for producers and consumers);
- free trade in cereals;
- improved operation of the OPAM.

These reforms have a dual objective:

- to increase or protect revenues of certain groups (particularly producers);
- to increase cereals production in an effort to guarantee food self-sufficiency.

Food aid was intended to be used over a transitional period. However, there appears to be a risk that the need will remain for some considerable time, since Mali has now become the Sahel's largest beneficiary of food aid. It should be pointed out that levels of food aid have increased only since the program was launched, rising from 28 to 36, then to 56, then to 90,000 tons in 1984/85.

The stated objectives of increased production and food self-sufficiency are thus far from being achieved.

Nevertheless, the PRMC should be given credit for the following successes:

- improved operation and reduced deficit of the OPAM;
- improved guarantee of producers' revenue (increased prices and maintenance of guaranteed prices immediately after the harvest through purchases from the OPAM at official prices);

- improved coordination between donors: the PRMC example, with its group of donors, has been used as a model for the CNAVS, the organization responsible for the management of food aid in Mali, which has recently been restructured in an aim to improve management, and above all to allow for greater transparency of the aid received. A certain degree of competition can be expected between the two organizations, however, and donors might be divided according to the types of project they prefer to support.

### Mauritania

In response to the increased volumes of food aid received in recent years, and to the higher prices of the aid that is sold, counterpart funds rose considerably from 996 million UM in 1983 to 1,700 million UM in 1984 (Berg report figures). A large proportion of these funds is used to pay domestic transportation costs for food aid, which are particularly high in Mauritania.

A new agricultural policy has recently been outlined in liaison with the FAO. This policy should be supported by a joint fund, for which a framework agreement was signed in 1985. Technical hitches have delayed the actual creation of the fund, but action is due to be taken in the near future.

### Niger

In a normal year, Niger achieves self-sufficiency, or even generates surpluses, as was the case this year. The country only receives food aid in emergency situations. The role of food aid in the definition of a cereals policy in Niger will thus be no more than a guarantee against drought. On the other hand, it could be highly useful as a means of moving surpluses to neighboring countries.

The government of Niger has demonstrated its ability to manage food aid in a coherent manner when it receives it. Despite secondary transportation difficulties (mainly caused by donors, who have not staggered their deliveries adequately), food aid has formed part of a global policy of which one of the central points has been the introduction of "contre-saison" agriculture in numerous locations, which has made it possible to stabilize and mobilize population groups in productive activities (instead of relying on passive participation by supplying refugee camps).

### Senegal

A new agricultural policy was adopted by the Senegalese government in 1984, and then completed in the light of the findings of the FAO study of cereals policies and programs. A number of objectives and orientations for concrete action were laid down as regards the production and marketing of cereals (rainfed as well as irrigated agriculture):

- intensification of production and research;
- strengthening of private-sector initiative;
- redefinition of the role of the Sociétés Régionales de Développement (8);
- creation of a Comité National des Céréales (9) to form an organization for the regulation of cereals markets (ORMC: cf PRMC) aiming to fulfill the executive roles formerly shared by the Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire (10) (for purchasing and storing cereals) and the Caisse de Péréquation et de Stabilisation des Prix (11) (for importing and distributing imported cereals).

In this respect, the joint counterpart fund created in 1985 can provide support, and numerous meetings between donors and the Senegalese authorities have made recommendations as to the uses to which this fund should be put. After an "operation vigna" (50,000 tons produced in 1985), which was conducted together with the EEC, the joint fund now appears to wish to concentrate on problems of cereals consumption and marketing (promotion of local cereals, stabilization of the proportion of wheat, disposal of vigna, etc.). This policy aims to increase the percentage of local produce in the Senegalese diet.

#### Chad

In view of the political difficulties and the relatively small amounts of food aid received by Chad in normal years, no clear policy has been laid down for the use of food aid as part of a cereals policy. Food aid is thus principally distributed as emergency aid only.

### 2.3 Analysis

Examination of the cereals policies of the countries of the Sahel demonstrates that policies are clearest in those countries where donors have developed concerted approaches, both between themselves and between them and the local authorities, in order to handle the management of the food aid they supply to a given country. In countries where a joint counterpart fund already exists (Mali and Senegal), or where such a fund is planned (Mauritania), cereals policies have been adopted and put into practice by the government.

Concerted approaches adopted on the question of food aid thus favor integration of national cereals problems. Food aid provides the means, particularly through counterpart funds, to finance preparatory studies and implementation of these cereals policies. In Mali, 250,000 tons of food aid are planned for delivery over 5

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- (8) Regional Development Companies
  - (9) National Cereals Committee
  - (10) Food Security Commission
  - (11) Price Subsidy and Stabilization Fund

years in order to finance the launch and subsequent operation of the PRMC.

However, while food aid provides a number of interesting possibilities, continued reliance on food aid constitutes a danger for the country concerned. Again, Mali provides a good example. From "level 0" in 1976/77, Mali became the Sahel's top beneficiary of food aid in 1985/86, and, despite good harvests, levels of aid remained high as a result of donors' commitments to the PRMC. Thankfully, certain donors managed to postpone or redirect their aid, converting it into local purchasing agreements or straight financing (Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, EEC substitution action, etc.). Others, however, did not have sufficient adaptability, and sent unsuitable aid (such as the 15,000 tons of rice sent by Italy) that can only have damaging effects on the local market and thus on the cereals policy of the country. All donors have shown interest and efficiency in resolving the problems of surpluses.

Food aid thus appears to be an interesting means of assisting the implementation of cereals policies, provided that it can adapt to the rapidly changing situations in the Sahel. The primary advantage of using food aid to promote cereals policies is that most donor countries are more ready to supply food aid than financial aid.

Food aid makes it possible to move certain of the Western countries' agricultural surpluses, and can even be used as a "bonus" to facilitate negotiations on commercial imports (title I US food aid coupled with highly advantageous credit terms, negotiations for cereals imports to Senegal and Mali, for which competition has recently increased between France, the USA and Canada).

Moreover, food aid is more "respectable" than a bank loan, for example, and is better suited to media campaigns in donor countries as well as in beneficiary countries.

Finally, food aid can make it possible for donor countries to keep transfers to third world countries at virtually constant levels, at a time when other types of aid, particularly financial, are tending to drop. The recent substantial reductions in the credits allocated under the cooperation budgets of certain countries (USA: approximately 20%; France: 20-25%) are in danger of accentuating this worrying tendency, while food aid budgets have remained constant, or are even on the increase. If food aid is not to be used unthinkingly, firm political conviction is required both from donors and beneficiaries.

This conviction has been manifested in varying degrees by different countries, and the recommendations of the Nouakchott Colloquy have produced some tangible effects in terms of action and reforms. The progress that has begun should now be taken further, and the Mindelo Colloquy will make it possible to take stock of the state of progress of the cereals policies of the Sahelian States, and to reiterate recommendations or make fresh proposals.



### III - PROPOSITIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Through analysis of food aid for the Sahel and of the use of that food aid, it is possible to measure the changes that have occurred since the Nouakchott conference. The problems encountered, particularly during the latest drought, demonstrate the difficulties that still exist, and can be used as the basis for a number of recommendations for the action that could be taken or the reforms that could be introduced. Those recommendations refer to:

- points covered in the first part of this report;
- new proposals.

#### 3.1 Recommendations

##### a) Proposed recommendations for evaluation of harvests

- Reinforcement of current crop-forecast and early-warning systems (cf Club du Sahel report);
- Improvement of statistical coverage of imports (commercial imports or food aid) and border exchanges; better knowledge of uses and village storage capacity to allow for more accurate calculation of cereals breakdowns;
- The use of a range of values rather than a precise figure when referring to deficits or surpluses;
- Reinforcement of national and international coordination.

##### b) Proposed recommendations for transportation and logistical problems

- Continuation of gathering, analysis and regular publication of information on distribution of food aid (WFP Africa Task Force);
  - Financing of investments (facilities, equipment or conversions) such as those proposed in French and Swiss studies for the removal of bottlenecks;
- Increased reliance on the private sector for transportation and storage;
- Adjustment of official prices in line with levels practised for commercial imports;
  - Establishment of and adherence to a preliminary global supply plan by beneficiary countries and donors in an effort to optimize timing and geographic distribution of deliveries, with the possibility of advance delivery of products in the event of poor harvests;

- Cancellation of retroactive deliveries except for replenishment of stocks;
- Increased reliance on triangular transactions (purchases in neighboring countries).

**c) Proposed recommendations for triangular transactions**

- Reinforcement of coverage of available surpluses (FAO - CILSS) and corresponding prices;
- Continuation of inventories in FAO and WFP reports, and addition of more details (sources, quantities, etc.);
- Simplification of procedures for timely release of funds for purchasing programs;
- Appraisal of operations in order to identify blockages, delays, etc., or presentation of exemplary cases;
- Improved coordination between countries in order to simplify procedures.

**d) Proposed recommendations for substitution action**

- Appraisal of substitution action taken by the EEC;
- Integration of substitution action with national cereals policies;
- Recommendation that other donors adopt similar approaches for the allocation of their food-aid funds.

**e) Proposed recommendations for counterpart funds**

- Continuation of statistical coverage and assessment of current funds;
- Reinforcement of training and information for local representatives and donors;
- Development of joint counterpart funds;
- Increased integration of counterpart funds within cereals policies, particularly in those countries where joint funds do not exist.

**f) Coordination**

The recommendations listed above cannot be introduced unless concertation and coordination between donors and local authorities is continued and strengthened at all levels:

- . at the national level, by creating or strengthening donor groups, NGO collectives and official coordination organizations;
- . at the regional level, particularly for coverage of transportation of aid and for triangular transactions, which are concrete means of achieving progress towards a regional cereals market;
- . at the international level, by continuing the efforts made towards concertation, started under the network for famine prevention in the Sahel, or by other international organizations (WFP Africa Task Force, FAO, etc.).

#### g) Gathering of data on food aid

The analysis of statistics on food aid is often very difficult, since methods of calculation or presentation of figures lead to a large number of possible variables (coefficients of equivalence between cereals, dates of assessment, etc.).

Considerable efforts thus remain to be made to coordinate approaches to the gathering of data. Improved coverage of each donation, through allocation of an internationally recognized code number that would be used by all parties, and associated with well defined criteria for equivalence, would allow for:

- improved awareness of real figures, and thus statistical uses of those figures;
- closer monitoring of donor commitments, by ensuring that aid actually arrives and is not recorded several times, as might be the case at present.

### 3.2 New Proposals

A brief outline is given here of a few new ideas on food aid that have been proposed by certain individuals or organizations.

#### a) Replacement of the idea of food aid by the idea of "food insurance"

Food aid would no longer be provided on a regular basis, but guarantees would be given for immediate supply in the event of difficulties, and thereby provide the country concerned with a kind of food insurance.

This idea does not merely involve a change in terminology, but is based on a completely amended approach to aid, both from the donor's viewpoint (action through yearly programs with fixed amounts) and from the beneficiary's viewpoint.

**b) International reserve of food aid for the Sahel**

The idea of "food insurance" would require donors to plan for fast delivery when the need arises. The notion of an international emergency reserve would be a suitable solution. An International Emergency Food Reserve already exists under WFP management, but it is chiefly used to supply refugee camps in various parts of the world. This reserve could either be extended, or a parallel reserve created, to cater for drought situations.

**c) Reserve fund for local purchasing and triangular transactions**

Special credits could be made available through this fund to finance local purchasing or triangular transactions.

One of the difficulties encountered in executing triangular transactions involves the poor synchronization between the market availability of products and the availability of funds to pay for them. When products can be bought, the money is not there, and when the money is there, there is nothing left to buy. Advance commitments on food-aid budgets for funds intended specifically for this type of purchase would make money available at the right time.

**d) Other products**

In view of the fact that, in principle, decreasing quantities of food aid are to be provided, the counterpart funds generated by food aid should also decrease. The long-term future of projects financed by these funds is likely therefore to be in jeopardy. These counterpart funds could continue to be augmented by sales of products that are not usually provided as food aid (seeds, farm machinery, etc.).

**e) Replacement of commercial imports by food aid**

At present, donors agree to abide by the principles of the FAO in matters involving dumping of surpluses (UMR regulations).

These regulations forbid (or at least restrict) the substitution of commercial imports by food aid. Certain parties believe, however, that the UMR clauses should be amended to allow wider scope for substitution.

In this way, the balance-of-trade deficits of importing countries would be lightened, and their level of indebtedness would thus fall, thereby releasing additional investment potential for rural development. At the same time, however, there is a risk of exacerbating the economic war that exists on those markets, and in the final analysis levels of food aid would rise and the food dependence of the countries involved would increase.

**f) Regional plan for management of food aid**

The existence of a regional plan for the management of food aid (which should be part of a regional cereals policy) would allow for improved management of the distribution of aid, and above all would make it possible to plan regional exchanges of cereals, which could be carried out under triangular arrangements, before any food aid was sent from outside the region.

All reflection undertaken on the problems of food aid at the regional level should thus be given as much encouragement as possible: meetings between cereals boards, reinforcement of work carried out by regional organizations (CILSS, CEAO, etc.) and the purpose and methods of such initiatives must be clearly defined so that harmful competition can be avoided. Nevertheless, regional policies must rely on solid national infrastructures.

**g) International code of conduct**

We now have fairly extensive knowledge of the positive and negative aspects of food aid, and we are starting to realize what should be done and what should not be done. Nevertheless, donor countries and beneficiary countries continue to do what they should not do or not to do what they should do. While it would be misleading to consider the problems in simple terms of right approaches and wrong approaches, a few basic principles could be identified, and could help maximize the positive aspects of food aid while minimizing the negative aspects. These basic principles could form part of an International Code of Conduct for the management and utilization of food aid, giving precise rules that governments and public- and private-sector operators (cereals boards, NGOs, etc.) would agree to respect.

**CONCLUSION**

The information and proposals given in the present report might lead certain parties to believe that reflection on food aid continually produces the same results. Most of the criticisms and proposals were indeed formulated and discussed at the Nouakchott conference. Have we really progressed since that conference?

The recommendations of the Noakchott conference were phrased in fairly wide terms, but have been applied in practice in the form of specific action or concrete reforms. Major developments can already be seen or are under way on the problems of assessment of harvests, the development of triangular transactions (or at least the principle of such transactions), and the creation of counterpart funds and joint counterpart funds.

International coordination has been strengthened. A network for the prevention of famine in the Sahel has been set up. Errors have

inevitably been made, but the 1984-85 drought was overcome without too critical a famine situation arising.

Positive developments have thus been made. The progress that has started should be continued and consolidated. The Mindelo Colloquy organized by the CILSS and the Club du Sahel on the cereals policies of the Sahelian States should provide an opportunity for more in-depth reflection and for further progress in achieving the aims that were outlined at the Nouakchott Colloquy, of which the network for famine prevention in the Sahel is a tangible result.

The Mindelo Colloquy is merely the next step in the process, and should make it possible to consolidate reflection and action on topics that have been raised since the Nouakchott Colloquy, as well as to deal with fresh proposals.

The aim of this report is to provide information that will further these objectives, and the author will be delighted to give any further details readers may require.